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Limited-Purpose Public Figures: 
Spence v. Flynt as an Illustration 
of the Need for a More Complete Test 
In July of 1985 Gerry Spence, the notorious trial lawyer 
from Wyoming, was named "Asshole of the Month" by Hustler 
magazine.' Subsequently, Mr. Spence filed suit for defamation 
against the publisher of Hustler magazine, Larry Flynt. Part I1 
of this note examines the important cases in defamation law 
that provide the background for Spence v. F1ynL2 Part I11 dis- 
cusses the facts of Spence and the reasoning behind the deci- 
sion. Part IV analyzes why the Wyoming Supreme Court's 
suggestion that Gerry Spence is a private figure under a spe- 
cial exception for attorneys could lead to unjust r e s ~ l t s . ~  Fi- 
nally, Part V proposes a three-part test for determining when a 
private individual is a limited-purpose public figure. This test 
strikes a balance between the vital protection offered by the 
First Amendment and the right of individuals without the 
opportunity of rebuttal or redress to be free from defamatory 
publications. 
The leading case in defamation law is New York Times Co. 
v. S ~ l l i v a n . ~  In New York Times, an elected official in Mont- 
gomery, Alabama brought suit in state court alleging that he 
had been libeled by an advertisement in The New York ~ i r n e s . ~  
The advertisement included false statements about police ac- 
1. Bits & Pieces, HUSTLER, July 1985, reprinted in Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 
771, 793 app. A (Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1668 (1992). 
2. 816 P.2d 771 (Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1668 (1992). 
3. Note that the Wyoming Supreme Court did not explicitly hold that Spence 
was a private figure but remanded the case to the district court to decide the 
issue. Id. at 779. However, the dicta in Spence discussing attorneys as public fig- 
ures, id. at  776-77, lends itself to a discussion of the need for a more complete 
test to determine if an individual is a limited-purpose public figure in certain cir- 
cumstances. 
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
5. Id. at 256. 
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tion allegedly ,directed against students who participated in a 
civil rights demonstration and police action against a leader of 
the civil rights movement? Sullivan claimed that the state- 
ments in the advertisement were defamatory and referred to 
him because his duties included supervision of the police de- 
partment.' 
The Supreme Court held that under the First and Four- 
teenth Amendments a state cannot award damages to a public 
official for defamatory statements relating to his official con- 
duct unless that official proves "actual malice." In other words, 
the public official must prove that the statement was made 
with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its 
truth? 
Three years later in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts: the 
Supreme Court ruled that defamatory statements concerning 
non-public officials may be protected by the First and Four- 
teenth Amendments if the individual defamed has somehow 
become a public figure.'' A plurality of the Court stated that a 
public figure who is not a public official could recover damages 
for a false defamatory statement if its "substance makes sub- 
stantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly 
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from 
the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered 
to by responsible publishers."" This standard was intended to 
form a more lenient rule than that required when public offi- 
cials are involved, but i t  "failed to gain acceptance by a majori- 
ty of the ~ourt ." '~ As a result of the Butts decision, the actual 
malice test applies to both public figures and public officials.13 
The most important decision in the area of public figure 
defamation doctrine is Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.14 In Gertz a 
Chicago policeman had been convicted of murder, and the 
victim's family retained Gertz to represent them in civil liti- 
gation against the policeman.15 An article appearing in the 
6. 
7. 
8. 
. 9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
Welch, 
13. 
14. 
15. 
Id. at 256-59. 
Id. at 258. 
Id. at 279-80. 
388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
Id. at 153-55. 
Id. at 155 (Harlan, Clark, Stewart, Fortas, JJ.). 
Michael J. Gunnison, Note, General Public Figures Since Gertz v. Robert 
Inc., 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 355, 362 (1984). 
Id. at 362-63. 
418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
Id. at 325. 
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defendant's magazine labeled Gertz a "Communist-fronter" and 
alleged that the criminal murder trial was part of a Communist 
conspiracy to discredit the local police. I t  also stated that Gertz 
had helped frame the policeman and implied that Gertz had a 
criminal record? Gertz brought an action for libel." 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Gertz, but the dis- 
trict court held that the actual malice standard of New York 
Times applied to the case.'' The court concluded that the ac- 
tual malice standard protects media discussion of a public issue 
whether or not the person defamed is a public official or a pub- 
lic figure. Since Gertz had failed to prove knowledge of falsity 
or reckless disregard of truth, judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict was entered for the defendant.'' The court of appeals 
affirmed the decision of the district court,20 but the Supreme 
Court reversed. 
The Court stated that, first, when a publisher defames an  
individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure, 
the publisher may not claim the actual malice standard as 
protection against liability even if the defamatory statements 
concern an issue of public or general interest?' Second, since 
private individuals have less effective opportunities of rebuttal 
than do public figures and public officials, they are more sus- 
ceptible to injury from defamation and the state's interest in 
protecting them is greater.22 Third, private figures are more 
deserving of recovery because they have not voluntarily ex- 
posed themselves to the risk of harm from d e f a m a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Fi- 
nally, the Court stated that Gertz was not a public figure and 
that without "clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the 
community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, 
an  individual should not be deemed a public figure for all as- 
pects of his life."24 Instead, the public figure issue should be 
decided by looking at the "individual's participation in the par- 
ticular controversy giving rise to the d e f a m a t i ~ n . ' ~ ~  
16. Id. at 326. 
17. Id. at 327. 
18. Id. at 329. 
19. Id. at 329 & n.2. 
20. Id. at 331-32. 
21. Id. at 344-48. 
22. Id. at 344. 
23. Id. at 344-45. 
24. Id. at 352. 
25. Id. 
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The Court's opinion in Gertz gave rise to the dual concepts 
of limited-purpose public figures and general-purpose public 
figures. As a result of this classification, courts have adopted a 
two-step inquiry in defamation cases. The first inquiry is: Has 
the plaintiff achieved "such pervasive fame or notoriety that 
[she] becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all con- 
t e x t ~ " ? ~ ~  If the plaintiff meets this test, then she is a general- 
purpose public figure and defamation of any aspect of her life is 
subject to  liability only under the actual malice standard. If the 
plaintiff is not a general-purpose public figure, a second inquiry 
must be undertaken: Has the plaintiff voluntarily injected her- 
self into the controversy which gave rise to the defamati~n?~' 
If the plaintiff meets this test, then she is a public figure for 
limited purposes and may win a defamation suit only by show- 
ing actual malice for those contexts in which she is a limited- 
purpose public figure.z8 
After the decisions in New York Times and Gertz, one of 
the key issues in any defamation litigation is whether the 
plaintiff is a public official, a public figure, or a private individ- 
ual. This classification will determine whether the plaintiff 
must prove that the defendant acted with actual malice or 
mere negligence. 
111. Spence u. Flynt 
A. Facts 
Gerry Spence represented Andrea Dworkin in her invasion 
of privacy suit against Hustler magazine. During the course of 
the litigation, Hustler named Gerry Spence "Asshole of the 
Month for July7' 1985 and wrote alleged defamatory informa- 
tion concerning him.2g The article attacked Spence's reputa- 
26. Id. at  351. 
27. Id. at  352. 
28. Id. 
29. Bits & Pieces, HUSTLER, July 1985, reprinted in Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 
771, 793 app. A Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1668 (1992). The defamatory 
column written about Gerry Spence is as follows: 
Many of [those] we name Asshole of the Month are members of that 
group of parasitic scum-suckers often referred to as lawyers. [This] 
shameless [group] (whose main allegiance is to money) [is] eager to sell 
out their personal values, truth, justice and our hard-won freedoms for a 
chance to fatten their wallets. The latest of these hemorrhoidal types to 
make this page is Jackson, Wyoming, attorney Gerry Spence, our Asshole 
of the Month for July. 
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tion as a "country lawyer" and characterized him as being both 
greedy and a phony, claiming his "just folks" and "family val- 
ues" reputation was merely a front.30 In response to the ar- 
ticle, Spence filed a suit for defamation. The district court 
granted Flynt's motion for summary judgment and Spence ap- 
pealed?' The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the summary 
judgment, stating that there was a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether or not Spence was a public figure, and ac- 
cordingly, remanded the case to the district court to decide the 
B. Reasoning 
Flynt's defense was "structured upon the proposition that 
Spence [had] taken up the fight against pornography, thrust 
himself into the controversy as a public figure, and [was] there- 
fore subject to response by persons taking the other side."33 In 
rejecting this defense, the Wyoming Supreme Court reasoned 
Spence dudes himself up in western duds and calls himself a "country 
lawyer," but the log-cabin image is . . . phony . . . . [He] is worth mil- 
lions and owns a 35,000-acre ranch. Spence's claim to fame is that in the 
name of "the little guy" he's won some mighty big judgments . . . . He'd 
like to add HUSTLER to the list [for Andrea Dworkin] . . . . In her lat- 
est publicity-grab, Dworkin has decided to sue HUSTLER for invasion of 
among other things. 
Dworkin seems to be an odd bedfellow for "just folks," "family values" 
Spence. After all, Dworkin is one of the most foul-mouthed, abrasive 
manhaters on Earth. In fact, when Indianapolis contemplated an antiporn 
ordinance co-authored by Dworkin, she was asked by its supporters to 
stay away for fear her repulsive presence would kill the statute. Spence, 
however, can demand as much as 50% of the take from his cases. And a 
possible $75 million would buy a lot of country for this lawyer . . . . [Ilt 
appears Gerry "This Tongue for Hire" Spence is more interested in pro- 
moting his bank account than the traditional values he'd like us to be- 
lieve he cherishes. 
This case is a nuisance suit initiated by Dworkin, a cry-baby who can 
dish out criticism but clearly can't take it. The real issue is freedom of 
speech, something we believe even Dworkin is entitled to, but which she 
would deny to anyone who doesn't share her views. Any attack on First 
Amendment freedoms is harmful to all . . . Spence's foaming-at-the-mouth 
client especially. You'd think someone of Spence's stature would know 
better than to team up with a censor like Dworkin. Obviously, . . . greed 
has clouded [his] senses. 
Id. 
3 0 
3 1 
32 
33. Id. at  776. 
Id. 
Spence, 816 P.2d at 772. 
Id. at 776-77. 
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that, although the article in Hustler was "imaginative expres- 
sion" and "rhetorical hyperbole"34 protected under the First 
Amendment of the Wyoming Constituti~n,~~ Gerry Spence was 
acting on behalf of another individual, "arguably without per- 
sonal invol~ernent."~~ The court stated that in this kind of sit- 
uation, "there ought to be, and there is, a limit."37 The court 
noted that whether or not Spence was personally opposed to 
pornography was not determinative, since he was only "repre- 
senting a client who [was] fighting pornography and [was] on 
her side only in the sense that he [was] providing professional 
services to  her."3g Thus, if Spence had been engaged in the 
controversy "beyond the confines of the litigation, he may [have 
been] subject to appropriate defamatory criticism-fair com- 
ment upon a matter of public c~ncern.'"~ However, because 
Spence did no more than represent his client in her litigation 
against Hustler, there was no constitutional privilege for the 
defamatory  publication^.^^ 
The court further reasoned that "[a] professional person, 
who may be a 'public figure' for some purposes, should be free 
to offer his services to a client as a private professional without 
being subjected to public figure defamati~n.'~' Otherwise, the 
lack of protection from defamation would have "a chilling effect 
upon attorneys who undertake to represent clients in difficult, 
unpopular, high profile, or sensational types of  case^.'"^ The 
court stated that under these circumstances an attorney "is not 
subject to defamation without recourse."43 The court empha- 
34. Id. at 774. 
35. WYO. CONST. art. I, 5 37. The Wyoming Supreme Court also cited to Hus- 
tler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 US. 46 (1988), and compared the ad parody in 
Falwell to the article in Spence. Spence, 816 P.2d at  774. Falwell involved a suit 
filed by Jerry Falwell for defamation against Hustler for its parody of a liquor ad 
in which Falwell was portrayed as having engaged in an incestuous drunken ren- 
dezvous with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell, 485 US. at 48. The Court in 
Falwell held that this "speech" was so outrageous and unbelievable that it was 
protected by the First Amendment. The Court further held that Falwell was a 
public figure for purposes of First Amendment law and denied his claim for dam- 
ages. Id. at  57. 
36. Spence, 816 P.2d at 774. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 777. 
43. Id. 
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sized that there must be a balance between freedom of speech 
and other interests protected by the Constitution and that  
"[flree speech cannot equate with the freedom to intimidate, 
destroy and defame an  advocate seeking to represent a cli- 
ent."44 The court concluded that a lawyer who is merely an  
advocate for a famous or controversial client is not a public 
figure simply because he has taken on that client, and that 
under the circumstances of this case and the principles of the 
Gertz decision Spence was entitled to his day in court.45 
Flynt, in its characterization of Spence as a public figure, 
relied in  part upon the publication of Spence's books, Trial by 
Fire" and With Justice for N ~ n e . ~ '  Neither book was pub- 
lished until after the defamatory article was written." Thus, 
the court reasoned that the controversy giving rise to the def- 
amation was Andrea Dworkin's fight against pornography and 
that Gerry Spence may not have been a public figure who had 
entered the fight against pornography previous to the publica- 
tion of the Hzlstler article.49 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Attorneys as Public Figures 
Several cases have addressed the issue of whether or not 
an  attorney becomes a public figure by virtue of her involve- 
ment in litigation. If an attorney is a prosecutor, she is often 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. GERRY SPENCE, TRIAL BY FIRE: THE TRUE STORY OF A WOMAN'S ORDEAL AT 
THE HANDS OF THE LAW (1986). This book describes a case in which Spence repre- 
sented Kim Pring, the 1978 Miss Wyoming and a champion baton twirler. Pent- 
house magazine published a short story about a baton-twirling Miss Wyoming, who 
bore a remarkable resemblance to Miss Pring. Miss Pring sued Penthouse Interna- 
tional and the author of the story for libel. The jury found for Miss Pring and 
awarded her $26.5 million in damages. Id. a t  396-97. However, the decision was 
reversed on appeal. Id. a t  446-52; see also Pring v. Penthouse Intl, Ltd., 695 F.2d 
438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983). 
47. GERRY SPENCE, WITH JUSTICE FOR NONE: DESTROYING AN AMERICAN MYTH 
(1989). 
48. The article was published in 1985, while the books were published in 1986 
and 1989. In order to be a public figure whom publishers are privileged to defame, 
absent malice, the party must a t  least have been involved in the public controversy 
before the defamatory statement was published. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 
U.S. 111, 134-35 (1979); see also Vern Sims Ford, Inc. v. Hagel, 713 P.2d 736, 739 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1986) ("[Pllaintiff must be involved in a public controversy before 
the defamatory statement is published."). 
49. Spence, 816 P.2d at 776. 
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considered to be a public official and must satisfy the New York 
Times actual malice standard to maintain a suit for defama- 
tion." However, if a private attorney has not thrust herself 
into the public controversy surrounding a case, she is a private 
figure and can sue under a negligence standard for defama- 
tion? The Supreme Court in Gertz held that an attorney is 
not a public figure simply because she is an officer of the court, 
is active in civic and professional associations, or has published 
many books and articles on legal  subject^.'^ The Court went 
on t o  state that an attorney, in order to become a limited-pur- 
pose public figure in relation t o  the litigation, must thrust her- 
self into the vortex of the public issue or engage the public's 
attention in order to influence the outcome of the l i t iga t i~n .~~  
B. Defining the Public Figure in Relation 
to the Particular Controversy Giving Rise 
to the Defamatory Publication 
In Spence the court suggested that because Gerry Spence 
had not injected himself into the fight against pornography as 
an individual, but had only agreed to represent a client in- 
volved in the fight against pornography, he was not a public 
figure for defamation purposes in relation to that particular 
50. Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The Press and the Law: Some Issues in Defamation 
Litigation Involving Media Coverage of Legal Affairs and Proceedings, 43 SW. L.J. 
1011, 1018 (1990). 
51. See, e.g., Western Broadcasting of Augusta, Inc. v. Wright, 356 S.E.2d 53, 
54-55 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that an attorney, who never availed himself of 
opportunities to present his case informally through news media and did not make 
use of whatever notoriety was thrust upon him to influence any public issues, was 
not a public figure); Steere v. Cupp, 602 P.2d 1267, 1273-74 (Kan. 1979) (stating 
that an attorney who actively represents a client does not become a public figure 
for limited purposes without an attempt to gain public attention to influence the 
outcome of the controversy); Kurth v. Great Falls Tribune Co., 804 P.2d 393, 395 
(Mont. 1991) (stating that an attorney does not become a public figure for defama- 
tion purposes merely because she represents a client who is of concern to the pub- 
lic). But cf. Finkelstein v. Albany Herald Publishing Co., 392 S.E.2d 559, 561 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1990) (holding that an attorney who had voluntarily and deliberately 
thrust himself into forefront of controversy by appearing on local television pro- 
gram for purpose of discussing problems occurring in specific cases was a public 
figure); Hayes v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 295 N.W.2d 858, 865-66 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1980) (holding that an attorney, by the manner in which he conducted himself in a 
public judicial proceeding and by consenting to television and newspaper inter- 
views, was a public figure and was required to prove actual malice). 
52. Gertz,418U.S. a t  351-52. 
53. Id. 
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controver~y.~~ However, in defining whether or not Gerry 
Spence was a public figure in relation to  the controversy which 
provoked the defamation, the court overlooked the fundamental 
reason for which Hustler attacked Mr. Spence. 
Hustler attacked Mr. Spence not only for his role as an 
attorney representing clients in the fight against pornography, 
but also for his role as an attorney in general. Ordinarily attor- 
neys are not public figures solely because of their choice of 
profession; Mr. Spence, however, is hardly an ordinary attor- 
ney. He is widely known, primarily for his choice of controver- 
sial clients:5 his unconventional courtroom tacticsP6 and his 
flamboyant style of representation.57 Although these charac- 
54. See supra part 1II.B. 
55. Mr. Spence has represented such controversial and notorious clients as 
Imelda Marcos, see Paul Moses, Imelda's True Believer, NEWSDAY, May 7, 1990, a t  
8; the surviving children of Karen Silkwood, see GERRY SPENCE & ANTHONY POLK, 
GERRY SPENCE: GUNNING FOR JUSTICE (1982); Dave Foreman, see Douglas S. 
Looney, Protector or Provocateur?: Dave Foreman, Cofounder of the Radical Group 
Earth First!, Faces Trial for Conspiracy, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 17, 1991, at  54; 
and Ed Cantrell, the Wyoming policeman charged with murdering his own under- 
cover agent, a key witness in a drug trial, to keep him from talking to a grand 
jury, see Paul Brirtkley-Rogers, Wyoming Jury Acquits City Sheriff on First-Degree 
Murder Charge, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1979, at C8. 
56. Some of Spence's controversial tactics have included the following: keeping a 
box containing "the embalmed leg his plaintiff had lost in t l e  accident at  issue" on 
the table in front of him during the trial, B e ~ e t t  H. Beach, The Fastest Gun in 
the West: Cowboy Attorney Gerry Spence Mows Down Corporate Giants, TIME, Mar. 
30, 1981, at 48; arguing with judges, "preceding questions with a brief preamble 
about why he is asking them and following them up with remarks such as 'good' 
or 'thank you,' " Paul Moses, Will Her Suffering Sway Marcos Jury?, NEWSDAY, 
June 3, 1990, a t  8; and making misleading statements to jurors, leading them to 
believe that the prosecution may have withheld evidence, William C. Rempel & 
Kristina M. Luz, Angry Judge Scolds Marcos Lawyer, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 1990, at  
A22. 
Spence is also famous for his unique opening statements, one of which was 
three and a half hours long and included a statement which admitted to mistakes 
even before the first witness had testified. Moses, supra note 55, at  8. One of 
Spence's opening statements was borrowed for a scene in the movie Legal Eagles 
in which a defense attorney played by Robert Redford tricks jurors into admitting 
they think his client is guilty before the trial begins. He then gives an inspiration- 
al speech on individual rights and persuades the jurors that his client deserves a 
fair trial and that they will give his client that right. Catherine M. Spearnak, 
Thanks to Message, Lawyers Forgive Film's Distortions, L.A. TIMES (San Diego 
County), Mar. 9, 1989, $ 6, at 1. 
57. Spence is described as "commanding." He is six feet, two inches tall and 
225 pounds. He moves constantly around the courtroom and speaks in a deep bari- 
tone. He likes to illustrate his arguments with props, such as a milking stool 
whose legs he removes one at a time to demonstrate how his opponent's case will 
collapse. He also enjoys using folksy, country sayings such as "You've got to get 
the hogs out of the spring if you want to get the water cleared up." Beach, supra 
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teristics are not always factors in determining if an individual 
is a public figure, Mr. Spence has used the media throughout 
his career to gain notoriety and success.58 He has published 
four books concerning his cases, his life story, and his methods 
of client repre~entation.~' Furthermore, although Mr. Spence 
had not become involved in the controversy regarding pornogra- 
phy and First Amendment rights before the 1985 Hustler arti- 
cle, he had voluntary thrust himself into the public eye as an 
attorney with a knack for defending the underdog, "just folks," 
and "family values."60 Spence's media exposure prior to 1985 
would appear to meet the Gertz standard of "clear evidence of 
general fame or notoriety in the community and pervasive in- 
volvement in the affairs of society,"61 thus classifying Spence 
as a public figure. Pervasive involvement in the affairs of soci- 
note 56, a t  48. 
58. Prior to 1985 Gerry Spence was notorious in the press as an attorney. See 
Chilton Williamson Jr., An American Myth, 1983 NAT'L REV. 332 (reviewing GERRY 
SPENCE & ANTHONY POLK, GERRY SPENCE: GUNNING FOR JUSTICE (1982)); Beach, 
supra note 56, at 48; Brinkley-Rogers, supra note 55, at  C8; Silkwood Damage 
Trial, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1979, at A5. Not only was Spence notorious in the 
papers, but prior to 1985 he also appeared as a guest on the television show "Late 
Night With David Letterman." See Sam Merrill, Playboy Interview: David Letter- 
man, PLAYROY, Od. 1984, at  65, 76. 
Since 1985 Gerry Spence has been discussed and quoted in numerous media 
articles, see supra notes 55-56. See also Spence, 816 P.2d at  794-95 app. B, for a 
list of media events in which Spence has participated. 
59. GERRY SPENCE & ANTHONY POLK, GERRY SPENCE: GUNNING FOR JUSTICE 
(1982); GERRY SPENCE, OF MURDER AND MADNESS (1983); GERRY SPENCE, TRIAL BY 
FIRE: THE TRUE STORY OF A WOMAN'S ORDEAL AT THE HANDS OF THE LAW (1986); 
GERRY SPENCE, WITH JUSTICE FOR NONE: DESTROYING AN AMERICAN MYTH (1989). 
60. See GERRY SPENCE & ANTHONY POLK, GERRY SPENCE: GUNNING FOR JUS- 
TICE (1982). In this book Spence commends himself for being a fighter for the 
underdog: "I am no longer a prosecutor of men. I save men from blind justice, 
which flogs out against the accused with cold iron hands." Id. at  8. Later in the 
book he describes himself as an attorney: 
Any trial lawyer can come [in] to the courtroom, demolish a witness, and 
perhaps strike a fatal blow to some opponent. But there is the occasional 
man who can do his gunfighting with grace and skill and style, which is 
an art and transcends the act of killing, which is the ultimate perfor- 
mance in the courtroom. 
Id. at 16. 
Spence called the Silkwood case "the most important case in history." Wil- 
liamson, supra note 58, at 333. Spence also stated that the cases in which he 
defends crime victims who sue their attackers for civil damages "are as close to 
basic historical justice as man has ever known." B e ~ e t t  H. Beach, Getting Status 
and Getting Even: The Victims' Movement Forces Some Criminals to Right Wrongs, 
TIME, Feb. 7, 1983, a t  40. Spence also discussed his representation of the underdog 
with 'I'IME in 1981. See Beach, supra note 56, a t  48. 
61. Gertz, 418 U.S. at  352. 
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ety could also be imputed from Spence's comments that his 
cases were of great importance to society and his claim as sav- 
ior of the underdog.62 
Although the article in Hustler may not have been pub- 
lished if Spence had not represented Andrea Dworkin, i t  did 
not attack him solely on that  basis. The Hustler article at- 
tacked him by pointing out that  "Spence dudes himself up in  
western duds and calls himself a 'country lawyer' " while being 
"more interested in promoting his bank account than the tradi- 
tional values he'd like us to believe he che r i~hes . "~~  The ar- 
ticle further noted that although Spence has won very large 
monetary judgments in the name of the 'little guy," he takes 
up to fifty percent of the money awarded?* Gerry Spence, by 
seeking publicity as an attorney and benefiting from such pub- 
licity, should also be subject to criticism for his notorious tech- 
niques and his claim to fame as an attorney who represents 
family values and wins cases for the underdog. When one bene- 
fits from the media, one must also bear the risk of media crit- 
icism. 
C. Access to Effective Opportunities for Rebuttal 
as a Deciding Factor in Defamation Litigation 
The Wyoming Supreme Court ignored the reasoning of 
Gertz which stated that the rationale for protecting private fig- 
ures or limited-purpose public figures is that they have less 
effective opportunities for rebuttal and therefore are more vul- 
nerable to injury from d e f a m a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
In this particular case, Gerry Spence has ample access to 
the media in order to rebut the accusations against his charac- 
ter as an attorney, and he has taken advantage of this opportu- 
nity. Few private persons have the opportunity to publish four 
books about their lives and careers, nor do they have extensive 
media exposure of the job that they perform. Gerry Spence has 
had all of these opportunities. If Hustler had defamed him in  
an area concerning something other than his career as an  at- 
torney, he may have had very little, if any, opportunity to use 
the media to rebut the defamation. However, since Hustler's 
comments concerned Spence's work as a n  attorney, something 
62. See supra note 60. 
63. See supra note 29. 
64. See supra note 29. 
65. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-45. 
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for which he is famous and receives frequent media coverage, 
this should be the least protected area of his life under the 
reasoning of Gertz. 
V. PROPOSED THREE PART TEST TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER DEFAMED INDIVIDUAL IS A PUBLIC FIGURE 
This note proposes a three part test to determine whether 
a person should be considered a public figure in defamation 
litigation when a limited-purpose public figure is involved. 
Instead of classifying the pubic figure only according t o  the 
controversy giving rise to the defamation, the public figure 
should also be classified in relation to the subject of defamatory 
attack. This dual classification would prevent the media from 
being censored when discussing an individual as a public figure 
in one area just because the person has not thrust herself to 
the forefront of the debate in a given controversy. 
A. Did the Plaintiff Voluntarily Inject 
Herself into the Particular Controversy 
Which Gave Rise to the Defamation? 
A court should first inquire whether the subject of an al- 
leged defamatory statement thrust herself into the vortex of 
controversy which encouraged the defamation. This is not a 
new test; it is simply a restatement of the one established in 
GertzG6 In many cases the plaintiffs participation in the par- 
ticular controversy which gave rise to the defamation will be 
determinative of whether or not the plaintiff is to be considered 
a public figure for the defamation litigation. For example, this 
situation may arise where the article defaming the plaintiff 
attacks the plaintiff solely for her involvement in the controver- 
sy and the article is limited to that issue. In Spence, however, 
Hustler attacked Gerry Spence not only for representing 
Andrea Dworkin in her invasion of privacy suit against Hustler 
but also for his past and present reputation as an attorney and 
his previous statements concerning his traditional values and 
his representation of the underdog. 
66. Id. 
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B. Did the Plaintiff Voluntarily Thrust Herself 
into the Public Eye on the Subject 
Addressed by the Defamatory Article? 
Secondly, the court should inquire whether the plaintiff 
had voluntarily thrust herself into the public eye on the subject 
addressed by the defamatory article. This step of the test ac- 
knowledges that a public controversy involving the plaintiff 
may give rise to a defamatory article which does not discuss 
the plaintiff in light of that particular controversy. Therefore, 
this test takes into account the subject of the defamatory arti- 
cle itself, not just the controversy giving rise to  it. This test can 
work both ways for plaintiffs. In Spence, Gerry Spence will be 
viewed as a public figure in that he is being attacked as an 
attorney for his past conduct, but not as a public figure in First 
Amendment litigation since he did not voluntarily express his 
personal views on this issue. On the other hand, if a plaintiff is 
involved in a public controversy and a defamatory article at- 
tacks her regarding a subject not related to that controversy, 
then the plaintiff is not a public figure for the unrelated subject 
even though the controversy the plaints  was involved in as a 
public figure gave rise to the publicity which promoted the arti- 
cle. 
Of course this particular test would only be effective if the 
plaintiff were a limited-purpose public figure under Gertz. If 
the plaintiff were a general-purpose public figure on the other 
hand, all aspects of her life would be subject to the actual mal- 
ice standard in defamation litigation. 
C. Does the Limited-Purpose Public Figure 
Have Effective Opportunities for 
Rebuttal Through the Media or Otherwise? 
If one of the first two prongs of the test is met, it must be 
determined whether the person is to  be considered a limited- 
purpose public figure in a particular area. Gertz made it clear 
that a private person's lack of access to the media increases a 
state's interest in protecting her?? Hence the third test in- 
quires whether the plaintiff has access to the media. This fac- 
tor becomes extremely important in cases involving attorneys 
and other professionals. Although a professional may be well 
67. Id. 
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known throughout her field, access to media and opportunities 
for rebuttal may be limited. An attorney may be well respected, 
or even notorious, and still lack the requisite media access t o  
be a limited-purpose public figure. However, access to the me- 
dia should be an important and decisive factor in a case such 
as this one; not only is Gerry Spence a well-known attorney, 
but he also has access to the media and has thrust himself 
voluntarily into the public eye in his role as an attorney. 
Active use of this third prong would help protect that 
which the Wyoming Supreme Court seemed so concerned about 
in its decision-the chilling effect upon attorneys taking on 
high profile, controversial, or unpopular clients. This third 
prong would also protect professional attorneys who do not 
voluntarily seek fame and notoriety through the media and 
who do not have access to it for rebuttal. So long as they have 
not met the required elements of the test, these attorneys 
would feel fiee to take on controversial cases without the fear 
that defamatory statements would be made about them or their 
personal lives. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This note concludes that, under the precedent-setting case 
of Gertz, Gerry Spence is a limited-purpose public figure in his 
role as a professional and as an attorney, but not as an individ- 
ual in First Amendment litigation. 
This note also suggests a three-part test to determine if an 
individual is a limited-purpose public figure in regards t o  par- 
ticular defamatory statements and publications. First, did the 
plaintiff voluntarily inject herself into the controversy giving 
rise to the defamatory publication or statement? Second, did 
the plaintiff voluntarily thrust herself into the public eye on 
the subject addressed by the defamatory publication? If one of 
these two tests has been met, the court must then determine if 
the plaintiff has sufficient access to the media or other means 
for effective rebuttal. If so, the plaintiff is considered a limited- 
purpose public figure for purposes of the defamatory litigation 
in question, and actual malice must be shown to win the suit. 
This test strikes a balance between the vital protection 
offered by the First Amendment and the right of private in- 
dividuals who lack the opportunity for rebuttal or redress to  be 
free fiom malicious and false publications. 
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